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Policy-making is rarely driven by evidence alone. Thus, climate scientists who adopt an 
‘evidence-based’ mindset, expecting more science to lead automatically to better policy, are 
likely to be disappointed.  Instead, embracing an ‘evidence-informed’ attitude to policy-
making will be more productive, recognising that evidence must be deployed in such a way 
as to interact persuasively with other factors.  Using the 5th Assessment Report of the IPCC 
as inspiration, this commentary argues that climate scientists would do well to consider five 
ideas and ultimately embrace an evidence-informed approach to presenting evidence.  
Introduction 
Consider the following statements: 
“Anyone who needed convincing about the scale of the [climate change] 
problem need only have watched the recent "Panorama" programme on the 
floods.” (Mullin, 20001) 
“Colleagues across the House can argue about whether [flooding] is linked to 
climate change or not. I very much suspect that it is” (Cameron, 2014i) 
Both statements comprise responses to Parliamentary questions in which ministers in the 
UK Government have been asked to explain recent extreme events.  In both cases, flooding 
is clearly linked to climate change, and this reflects a wider tendency to make a connection 
between environmental change and the increasing frequency of extreme events. Yet, 
despite continuing high profile claims about the urgency and gravity of the threat of climate 
change, policy seems to lag behind, and climate-based disasters gradually fade from media 
headlines.  So why does meaningful policy not result, even when policy-makers appear to 
accept that climate change is causing problems?  Put simply, it is because policy-making is 
rarely ‘evidence-based’. 
 
1- Reject an ‘evidence-based’ mindset 
It is clear that the growing confidence in climate science and observable impacts of climate 
change have led many policy-makers to believe that climate change is a serious issue; 
however, considering the lack of meaningful action on climate change, this logic does not 
readily translate into policy-makers believing that it is politically possible to act.  Students of 
the policy process would not be surprised that evidence fails to influence policy in a linear 
fashion (rejecting figure 1)ii, instead finding that scientific rationality must interact alongside 
other factors.     
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Figure 1 - Is policy usually ‘based’ on evidence alone?  Additionally, even if evidence was the only factor in 
the policy-making process, this would not automatically mean that policy was made on this evidence.  The 
evidence itself might be presented in an unpalatable way for policy-makers, thus failing to impact on policy 
even in the absence of other influences.     
 
Indeed, the critical factor in Kingdon’siii analysis of Government agenda-setting refers to the 
influence of political conditions on scientific evidence, stating that if an idea does not fit 
prevailing conditions, then politics can supersede even the most pressing and well 
researched science.  In many environmental controversies, therefore, no amount of 
scientific evidence can influence policy and solve problemsivv, even if policy-makers 
understand that the evidence is convincing.  Policy-making in the climate realm is no 
exception, with many authors finding overwhelming evidence to suggest that policy 
responses ‘reflect{s} a political balance of power rather than any firm direction derived from 
science’ vi.  Indeed, as a result of its tacit loyalty to an evidence-based agenda, Hulmevii has 
argued that the IPCC (particularly the First Working Group’s focus on the physical science 
basis) is ‘no longer fit for purpose’, because a continued focus on producing ‘more’ science 
fails to understand that policy is not formulated in the way described in figure 1.  
   
2- Embrace an ‘evidence-informed’viii approach 
Climate scientists could address the question posed by Schön, in which he characterises 
messy policy arenas as ‘swampy lowlands’ix: 
‘Shall …. [the scientist] descend to the swamp...and forsake technical 
rigor...[and] deliberately involve himself in messy but crucially important 
problems?’ 
In climate change negotiations, progress is often hampered by competing economic 
interests and issues of environmental justice, not by lack of evidence; questions such as who 
wins?  Who loses?  Who decides?  Whilst technical rigor remains vital, it can be productive 
to enter the ‘swamp’, seeking to understand the nature of competing interests and learning 
how to deploy evidence alongside these other considerations.   
Solomon and Manningx might discourage the IPCC and climate scientists more widely 
from making such a shift, arguing that they ‘must maintain…rigor’ as this is the 
‘foundation for the most appropriate next steps in…climate policy’.  However, just as 
foundations are useless unless something is built upon them, providing ‘the facts’ to 
policy-makers are wasted if no meaningful policy results.   
 
3- Greater certainty might not make a difference 
An overemphasis on the continued reduction of scientific uncertainty can be misguided.  
The IPCC’s 5th Assessment report (1st Working Group) emphasised that the body was 95% 
certain that humans were responsible for climate change, a 5% increase from the 4th 
Assessment report.  Whilst it should be acknowledged that in some disciplines a 95% 
confidence level would be significant (this can reject the null hypothesis), it is unwise to 
consider that this approach to certainty is adopted by policy-makers.  So is it likely that a 
95% confidence level or more will be influential when we acknowledge that their decisions 
are influenced by much more than science?   
To argue in the affirmative would reinforce an assessment of the policy process which is 
linear, arguing that more science leads to better policy.  In contrast, some complex 
environmental controversies can never be solved by an infinite amount of science, as the 
prevailing conditions are not right for that evidence to be influential.  Thus, if we reject this 
linearity, then we must also start to question the value of continuing with efforts to focus 
constantly on improving scientific certainty, particularly in ‘wicked problems’ where 100% 
certainty is impossible. 
 
4- Tell good news stories 
Telling good news stories is essential.  Although climate change is undoubtedly serious, do 
climate scientists have to present doom-laden evidence much of the time?  Even some 
climate scientists have vociferously argued that they are weary of apocalyptic discourses, 
exemplified by the following reaction to the Second Working Group report within the IPCC’s 
Fifth Assessment:  
"The message in the first draft was that… these were manageable risks…This has 
completely disappeared from the [final] draft…which is all about the impacts of 
climate change and the four horsemen of the apocalypse." (Tol, 2014xi) 
Whilst the wider media reaction to the report of the Second Working Group generally 
recognised a shift towards a position which argued that adaptation to climate was possible, 
the public withdrawal of Professor Tol from the report indicates that an opportunity was 
missed to create a pervasive positive narrative.  There is plenty of evidence that telling 
‘good news’ stories works.  Flyvbjergxii, for example, shows that policy-makers often like to 
see something ‘work’ on the ground before they consider whether to enact policy, and 
other disciplines have illustrated the value of communicating success storiesxiii.   
So where are all the climate success stories?  In making this point, I do not imply that there 
are few examples of effective climate action, instead arguing that there should be greater 
communication of successful projects.  Currently, from the point of view of someone who 
conducts research in climate science, I struggle to think instantly of a range of examples 
where there have been successful climate interventions.  Thus, it would be useful if success 
stories were highlighted more in climate reports so that references to these examples could 
be commonplace, acting as a model for best practice.  Climate scientists would do well to 
extend the sentiment that was present at times within the Second Working Group report 
(that adaptation is possible), showing those policy-makers who aren’t currently making 
meaningful climate change policies that action on climate change can work.   
5- ‘Re-frame’ climate science in a policy relevant way 
Attaching the project to a politically salient issue has increased the influence of many ideas 
amongst policy-makers; for example, ‘ecosystem services’ in nature conservation can show 
that doing the right thing for nature doesn’t necessarily mean doing the worst thing for the 
economy (perhaps a Faustian bargain, nevertheless).  A useful example of astute framing of 
evidence can be viewed by analyzing the campaign of the Royal Society for the Protection of 
Birds (RSPB) against the trade in wild birds.  The RSPB was able to ‘re-frame’ their evidence 
against wild bird trading when they sensed an opportunity to package it in a politically 
salient way.  They had campaigned for a long period of time to achieve an EU ban, 
presenting clear evidence that the trade was ongoing.  Initially, this evidence was framed on 
animal welfare grounds, but this line of argument failed to impact on policy.  However, 
when the bird flu crisis struck, the RSPB were able to show that the trade in wild birds was a 
serious issue for human health, potentially providing an avenue for spreading the disease 
further.  This salient framing of the same evidence had an immediate influence on policyxiv.  
Where possible, climate science should be communicated in a policy relevant way (the IPCC 
is meant to be ‘policy relevant’ after all), showing that doing the right thing for climate is not 
always alien to other priorities.  Of course, this won’t always be possible, but climate 
scientists can productively seek a better understanding of current political priorities, and 
consequently package their evidence in a more influential way.   
Conclusion 
This commentary has argued that when presenting climate science to policy-makers it is 
rarely adequate for evidence to be merely ‘correct’; it must also be persuasive.  And thus, 
climate scientists would do well to pay more attention to understanding how policy 
negotiations work, what could be done to ameliorate differences between decision-makers, 
and how science could be presented in persuasive form.  Because, at times, researchers ‘are 
informing battles’ but are often ‘not providing the knowledge needed...to win the war’ and 
thus they must start to work ‘outside {their} comfort zone’xv.  
The battle to protect the world from climate change will not be won by firing a single canon 
repeatedly at decision-makers loaded with a slightly larger cannonball each time proving 
that humans are responsible for climate change or expecting extreme climate events to 
convince policy-makers to take sudden action.  Rather the battle may be won by firing a 
broadside shot at policy-makers, which is loaded with targeted information about how 
policy systems work, which issues are particularly prominent in holding up meaningful 
action and then frame evidence accordingly, and lastly practical solutions to overcome 
them.  In directing these efforts wisely, climate scientists can win battles.  Otherwise, in 
several years times policy-makers might again be vociferously blaming another extreme 
event on climate change and leave climate scientists wondering why little attention was 
paid to the accumulating evidence. 
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- Is policy usually ‘based’ on evidence alone?  Additionally, even if evidence was the only factor in 
the policy-making process, this would not automatically mean that policy was made on this evidence.  The 
evidence itself might be presented in an unpalatable way for policy-makers, thus failing to impact on policy 
even in the absence of other influences.     
 
